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25 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW
serving in the United States armed forces were relaxed considerably. 17
Finally, in June, 1952, the former oath requirements18 were amended
and the section setting out the exact form of the oath was repealed. 19
The amended section retains the first four promises required by the
former oath,2 0 but adds a fifth promise:
... (5) (A) to bear arms on behalf of the United States
when required by the law, or (B) to perform noncombatant
service in the Armed Forces when required by the law, or
(C) to perform work of national importance under civilian
direction when required by the law.
2'
This conclusively clarifies the congressional intent that a promise
to bear arms is not an absolute requirement, if the petitioner can show
by clear and convincing evidence that he is opposed to bearing arms
by reason of religious training and belief.2 2 The amended section
however, still requires an oath in open court as a prerequisite to
naturalization. 23 The problem of the instant case, cannot hereafter
arise, since no exact form of the oath is prescribed in the amended
section. Under the stated facts of the present case and in view of the
repeal of the exact form of the oath which contained the phrase
objected to, it is submitted that the petitioner here could now be
admitted to citizenship.
MORIO OMORI
RIGHT TO INSPECT MEMORANDA USED TO REVIVE RECOLLECTION
D was indicted for the crime of driving while intoxicated. While
testifying at D's trial, a witness for the state refreshed his memory by
reference to certain notes which he had in his possession. D's counsel
requested that he be allowed to inspect the notes. The trial court
denied the request. D appealed from a conviction in the trial court.
The Colorado Supreme Court held: Reversed.' The court stated the
1756 STAT. 182 (1942), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1005 (Supp. 1946). These amendments
prompted some lower federal courts to rule that an alien conscientious objector
who served with the armed forces as a non-combatant was entitled to naturaliza-
tion, notwithstanding inability to take the oath without mental reservation if jt
implied willingness to bear arms. In re Sawyer, 59 F.Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1945);
In re Kinlock, 53 F.Supp. 521 (D. Wash. 1944).
1854 STAT. 1157 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 735 (1946).
166 STAT. 258, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1448 (Supp. 1952).
"'. .. (1) to support the Constitution of the United States, (2) to renounce
and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty . . . (3) to support and defend the Constitution and
the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and (4)
to bear true faith and allegiance to the same .... 54 STAT. 1157 (1940), 8 U.S.C.
§ 735(a) (1946).
"166 STAT. 258, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1448(a) (Supp. 1952).
2'Ibid.
=Ibid.
'Eckhardt v. People, 250 P.2d 1009 (Colo. 1952).
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applicable rule in these words: ". . . when, in the trial of a criminal
case, a witness for the prosecution, while testifying, refreshes his
memory by reference to a memorandum, defendant's counsel is en-
titled as a matter of right to an opportunity of inspecting and examin-
ing such memorandum for the purpose of cross-examination, and
denial of this right is prejudicial error."
2
The court's holding states a virtually universal rule,3 which
applies in civil cases4 as well as in criminal cases. 5 The court, how-
ever, points out that the principal case is a case of first impression in
Colorado.0 For this reason it is perhaps appropriate to consider the
rationale of the majority rule and to discuss its applications and its
exceptions.
Fundamentally, the rationale of the rule has two interrelated
bases. In the first instance, the opposing counsel should have the
opportunity to inspect such memorandum in order to determine if,
in fact, the witness is using the memorandum to refresh his present
recollection, that is, to recall facts of which he has independent know-
ledge.7 If, in fact, the witness has no independent knowledge and is
simply stating the facts as they appear on the memorandum, the
testimony of such witness is inadmissible8 unless the rules of re-
corded past recollection are complied with.9 In the former situation
the memorandum is used merely as an aid in recollection and is not
itself testimony,' 0 while in the latter situation the memorandum
itself becomes a part of the witness's testimony." The second basis
for the rule is that opposing counsel should have the right to inspect
in order to cross-examine the witness and point up any matters
which would affect the credibility of the witness and consequently
the weight of his testimony.
12
2Id. at 1010.
'See State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1937); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 762 (3d ed. 1940).
'Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Schwickert v. Levin, 76 App.Div. 373, 78 N.Y. Supp.
394 (2d Dep't 1902); Duncan v. Seeley, 34 Mich. 369 (1876); cf. Traber v. Hicks,
131 Mo. 180, 32 S.W. 1145 (1895).
'Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644
(1938) ; State v. Taylor, 83 Ohio App. 76, 77 N.E.2d 279 (1947) ; State v. McMahan,
57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (required by statute); People v. Schepps, 217
Mich. 406, 186 N.W. 508, 21 A.L.R. 658 (1922); State v. Nardini, 186 S.W. 557
(Mo. App. 1916).
'Eckhardt v. People, 250 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Colo. 1952).
'Green v. State, 53 Tex.Cr. 490, 110 S.W. 920, 22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 706 (1908);
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 762 (3d ed. 1940).
83 WIGCMORIE, EVIDENCE § 758 (3d ed. 1940). The right to inspect exists in order
to prevent the use of false aids which could result in false or manufactured testi-
mony. People v. Schepps, 217 Mich. 406, 186 N.W. 508, 21 A.L.R. 658 (1922);
Green v. State, 53 Tex.Cr. 490, 110 S.W. 920, 22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 706 (1908).
9The rules governing recorded past recollection are considered in 3 WICMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 734-755 (3d ed. 1940).
"Jurgiewicz v. Adams, 71 R.I. 239, 43 A.2d 310 (1945); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 763 (3d ed. 1940).
"3 WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 754 (3d ed. 1940).
"2See note 5 supra. 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 762 (3d ed. 1940).
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Wigmore contends that the rule of inspection should also be
applied to the use of memoranda referred to by a witness for the
purpose of refreshing his memory before he takes the stand to de-
liver his testimony. 13 This view has received recognition by at least
one state court in a criminal action. 14 However, the United States
Supreme Court has held that in criminal actions the rule does not
so apply.'5 Of the state courts which have passed on the question,
the majority have taken the position of the Supreme Court in criminal
cases.' 6 In civil actions the federal courts 17 and the state courts's
are uniform in holding that the rule of inspection does not apply to
the situation in which the witness refers to the notes prior to taking
the stand. The Colorado rule has not been established, but on the
basis of dictum' 9 and the precise language of the principal case,
20 it
seems fairly certain that the Colorado court would restrict the right
of inspection, at least in criminal cases, to memoranda utilized by the
witness while testifying.
2 '
Before an opposing counsel can contend that the trial court
committed reversible error in denying him the right to inspect, coun-
sel must have made a proper demand to the trial court.22 On appeal,
1'3 WLGMoINE, EVIDENCE § 762 (3d ed. 1940).
"State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100 At. 64 (1917). The reasoning of the Rhode
Island court is worthy of quotation: ". . . the mere fact that the witness did not have
the record [i.e., the memorandum] immediately before him when he gave his
testimony upon the stand does not seem to us to be material in view of the further
fact that he had a very short time previously refreshed his recollection by its ex-
amination; such examination being made in contemplation of the evidence which
he was about to give." 100 Atl. 64, 69-70.
"Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). The Court ruled that when
notes are used before testifying the right of inspection is not absolute but rather
is within the court's discretion. The Court in the Goldman case adopted the rule
of the court of appeals as had been established in the criminal case of Lennon v.
United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927).
Since the holding in the Goldman case no federal district court has been
reversed on the grounds that its refusal to grant the right of inspection under
these circumstances was an abuse of discretion. Echart v. United States, 188 F.2d
336 (8th Cir. 1951); Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); United States v. Cohen, 148 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 852 (1945) ; United States v. Toner, 77 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1948), rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949).
"State v. Strain, 84 Ohio App. 229, 82 N.E.2d 109 (1948) ; State v. Paschall, 182
Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
11C. W. Hull Co. v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 208 Fed. 260 (8th Cir. 1913).
But cf. The Alpha. Finley v. Daly Tankship Corp., 44 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
"Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 53 N.E.2d 705 (1944); McCoy v. Courtney,
30 Wash.2d 125, 190 P.2d 732 (1948); cf. Williams v. Duluth Street Ry. Co., 169
Wis. 261, 171 N.W. 939 (1919).
"See Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 599, 199 P.2d 897, 904 (1948).
"'Eckhardt v. People, 250 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Colo. 1952).
"As to the question of what types of writings may be properly used by a witness
to refresh his memory, see Lawson v. Glass, 6 Colo. 134 (1881) ; Denver & Rio Grande
R. Co. v. Wilson, 4 Colo.App. 355, 36 Pac. 76 (1894); 3 WIGMORE, EVDENCE §§ 758-
761 23d ed. 1940); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 105 (i) (1942).
Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
644 (1938); Parks v. Biebel, 18 Colo.App. 12, 69 Pac. 273 (1902); cf. State v. Pea-
cock, 236 N.C. 137, 72 S.E.2d 612 (1952).
In civil actions in Colorado, to make a proper demand, counsel should move
the court to instruct the witness that counsel has a right to see the memoranda.
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following a refusal, counsel is entitled to a reversal unless it is clear
from the record that the trial court's refusal was harmless error.23
Normally counsel should be allowed to inspect all notes which the
witness has taken to the stand and which relate to the subject of
testimony, not merely those parts of the notes which the witness has
used to refresh his memory.24 But the extent of inspection is within
the sound discretion of the court, and the court may limit counsel's
request by allowing him the right to inspect only those notes which
the court deems proper under the circumstances of the particular
case. 25 Note also that the right is not absolute when the witness used
the notes only on cross-examination with the permission of examining
counsel. 2 6 Similarly, it is within the court's discretion to grant or
deny the request for inspection where on direct examination the
witness is hostile or evasive and the memorandum is read to the wit-
ness rather than being referred to directly by the witness.
27
Upon the granting of a proper request, the opposing counsel may
use the memorandum as the basis of cross-examination. 28 He may
also read it or show it to the jury.29 In the majority of jurisdictions,
however, counsel may not offer the memorandum into evidence.
30
It is submitted that the use of the memorandum by the opposing
counsel as evidence should be left to the discretion of the trial court.31
In summary, the principal case firmly establishes the majority
rule32 as the law in Colorado. Nonetheless, of necessity, the instant
Directing the request to the witness is improper. Likewise making a motion to
suppress the witness's testimony is not a proper demand. Parks v. Biebel, supra.
mPhillips v. United States, 148 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1945) semble; Miller v. United
States, 126 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1942) , cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942) ; Taylor v. Unit-
ed States, 19 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1927) ; State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d
42 (1937).
2Brownlow v. United States, 8 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1925) ; State v. Nardini, 186
S.W. 557 (Mo. App. 1916); 3 WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 762 (3d ed. 1940).
'Lee v. Follensby, 86 Vt. 401, 85 Atl. 915 (1913) ; Morrow v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.
519, 120 S.W. 491 (1909); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 762, 765 (3d ed. 1940).
2State v. Braathen, 77 N.D. 309, 43 N.W.2d 202 (1950).
"United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. M. Kraus & Bros., 149 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S.
614 (1946). Counsel does have the right to inspect, however, where the witness,
although hostile or evasive, refers to the memorandum directly. State v. Miller,
234 Mo. 588, 137 S.W. 887 (1911).
"People v. Schepps, 217 Mich. 406, 186 N.W. 508, 21 A.L.R. 658 (1922); Green
v. State, 53 Tex.Cr. 490, 110 S.W. 920, 22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 706 (1908); 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 762 (3d ed. 1940).
2Jurgiewicz v. Adams, 71 R.I. 239, 43 A.2d 310 (1945) ; Green v. State, 53 Tex.
Cr. 490, 110 S.W. 920, 22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 706 (1908); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 763 (3d
ed. 1940).
"Jurgiewicz v. Adams, 71 R.I. 239, 43 A.2d 310 (1945). The Massachusetts
court has laid down an unusual rule in allowing the counsel for whom the witness
is testifying to introduce the memorandum into evidence, though otherwise in-
competent, when the opposing counsel has been granted the right to inspect the
memorandum and has done so. Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 53 N.E.2d 705,
151 A.L.R. 1002 (1944).
"Jurgiewicz v. Adams, 71 R.I. 239, 43 A.2d 310 (1945) (by implication); 3
WisMoRE, EVIDENCE § 765 (3d ed. 1940).
3See notes 3 and 5 supra.
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case leaves many questions unsettled. As applied to criminal actions,
the subsidiary problems involving proper demand, scope of inspection,
use of the memorandum after receipt thereof, and the applicability
of the rule to notes consulted before testifying are all questions which
the Colorado court will have to answer in the future.
HOWARD KLEMME
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES UNDER COLORADO RULE 33
P brought an action for damages for personal injuries received
in an automobile accident. Prior to the date of trial, interrogatories
were submitted to D pursuant to Rule 33 of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure.' D admitted in the answers to the interrogatories
that he was driving the car in which P was injured and that he knew
the car was in an unsafe condition. At the trial D failed to appear.
The answers to the interrogatories were introduced into evidence by
P. Counsel for D then offered evidence of two eye witnesses to the
accident who testified that P was driving the car when the accident
occurred. P contended that the witnesses should not be allowed to
contradict the admissions made by D in his answers to the interroga-
tories. The trial court allowed the witnesses to testify over P's objec-
tions. On appeal, the Colorado court held: Affirmed. An admission
made by a party in answer to an interrogatory is not conclusive against
him and he may offer evidence at the trial to contradict his previous
answers.
2
In Colorado a party has various alternative methods of dis-
covering facts to aid in the preparation for trial; the most widely
used method is by oral examination under Rule 30.3 Under this
Rule the testimony of any person may be taken under oath with the
right of cross-examination. At the trial the interrogated party may
rebutt any evidence contained in the deposition but the deposition, if
admissible in evidence, may be used to impeach the witness. 4 An-
other method available is the use of written interrogatories under Rule
31. 5 This method is available for taking depositions anywhere and
is particularly convenient for taking depositions in distant places.
This procedure is similar to taking an oral deposition under Rule 30
except it is less suitable for a complicated inquiry or for a searching
interrogation of a hostile or reluctant witness.6
'COLO. R. Civ. P. 33.
'Ridley v. Young, Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sheet, p. 164, February 21, 1953.
SCOLO. R. Civ. P. 30.
'See COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(d) for other uses of the deposition.
'COLO. R. Civ. P. 31.
'Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN.
L. REV. 737, 747, 748 (1939).
